| Speaker : | Venkat Anantharam |
| UBC (University of California, Berkeley) | |
| Date: | 19/06/2013 |
| Time: | 11:00 am - 12:00 pm |
| Location: | LINCS Meeting Room 40 |
Abstract
We study a game-theoretic model for security/availability in a networking context. To perform some desired task, a defender needs to choose a subset from a set of resources. To perturb the task, an attacker picks a resource to attack.We model this scenario as a 2-player game and are interested in describing its set of Nash equilibrium. The games we study have a particular structure, for which we can use the theory of blocking pairs of polyhedral, pioneered by Fulkerson, to arrive a reasonably satisfactory understanding of the Nash equilibrium. The subsets of resources that support Nash equilibrium strategies of the attacker,called “vulnerability sets”, are of particular interest, and we identify them in several specific games of this type. An example of a game of this sort is when the set of resources is the set of edges of a connected graph,the defender chooses as its subset the edges of a spanning tree,and the attacker chooses an edge to attack with the aim of breaking the spanning tree.
(joint work with Assane Gueye, Aron Laszka, and Jean Walrand)