|Speaker :||Jim Roberts|
|Time:||2:00 pm - 3:00 pm|
|Location:||Paris-Rennes Room (EIT Digital)|
Authors: Mahdieh Ahmadi, James Roberts, Emilio Leonardi, and Ali Movaghar
While the cost of the access network could be considerably reduced by the use of caching,this is not currently happening because content providers (CPs), who alone have the detailed demand data required for optimal content placement, have no natural incentive to use them to minimize access network operator (ANO) expenditure. We argue that ANOs should therefore provide such an incentive in the form of direct
subsidies paid to the CPs in proportion to the realized savings. We apply coalition game theory to design the required subsidy framework and propose a distributed algorithm, based on Lagrangian decomposition, allowing ANOs and CPs to collectively realize the optimal memory for bandwidth tradeoff. The considered access network is a cache hierarchy with per-CP central office caches, accessed by all ANOs, at the apex,
and per-ANO dedicated bandwidth and storage resources at the lower levels, including wireless base stations, that must be shared by multiple CPs.