#### Green Mining: toward a less energetic impact of cryptocurrencies

Philippe Jacquet (Nokia Bell Labs) Bernard Mans (Macquarie University) Blockchain workshop 2019 June 12 LINCS, Paris

# Energy wasted by Bitcoin

- 40 G kWh/year
- A country like Greece
- 6% France
- 0.25% World



# Proof of Work

• Each block miner must find a hash value with 74 initial zeroes out of 256 bits.



- Difficulty is adjusted in order to have
  - 10 mn inter-block time in average

#### **Evolution of difficulty**

Change every 2016 blocks (approx 2 weeks)



**Bitcoin: Mining Difficulty and Price** 

#### Alternative to PoW

• The block mining via Inversed leader election



#### **Direct leader election**

- n initial competitors a probability p.
  - Eg n=10<sup>6</sup>, p=0.5
  - At each step survivors survive with probability p  $p^{I}$
  - Process stops when # survivors=0
- n -leader(s) is/are the last survivor(s),

#### **Reverse leader election**

- Take k such that  $p^k n \ll 1$ 
  - At each step leaders selected with proba  $p^{k-1}$
  - Process stops when # leaders>0



#### Properties of reverse leader election

For n<p<sup>-k</sup>=N the number of leaders (block mined per election) M<sub>n</sub> is bounded in distribution

$$= E[M_n] < \min\{n, AN^{1/k}\}, A \approx \frac{1}{\log(1/p)}$$

- For N= $2^{32}$  and k=16: less than 4
- -For n>N  $E[M_n] > np$
- N and p fixed as initial parameters,
  - no need to review and update every 2016 blocks

# Green mining format

• Regular block

#field	value
1	Previous block hash
2	date
3	Transactions ref
4	Next block call value
5	Block hash

- Next block call value field in regular block
  - It replaces nonce field
  - is fixed by protocol to be  $2^{256}/N$
  - Next regular block should have hash value smaller than previous block call value.

# Empty blocks

- With N=2<sup>32</sup> the difficulty is not very big
  - But no nonce to tune
  - The hash value can only be modified by modifying the transaction references. More difficult!
- Virtually impossible to have a hash value smaller 2<sup>256</sup>/N. (or take N=2<sup>64</sup>)
  - After one minute an empty block is inserted with a call value higher by a factor 1/p.

# **Empty blocks**

#field	Field value
1	Hash of previous block
2	date
3	Next block call value
4	Block hash

If no regular block is mined after one minute, a new empty block is mined with call value =previous call value/p The process restarts after k rounds (call value reaches 2<sup>256</sup>-1)

# Empty blocks

#field	Field value
1	Hash of previous block
2	date
3	2 <sup>280</sup> -1
4	Block hash

Last call value releases all blocks

## Empty blocks mining



(Y4<Call3)

(Y5<Call1)

#### • Empty block mining options

- Can be mined by a central entity
- Can be mined in a decentralized mode
  - Filtered by the block dates
- Implicit empty block mining
  - Regular blocks filtered by hash values and dates

## Performance analysis

- Explicit empty block mining
- Theorem [explicit empty blocks]:  $E[M_n] = np^k + \sum_{i=1}^k np^{k-i} \prod_{i<i} (1-p^{k-i})^n$ - Proof: the probability to reach round 1 is  $\prod_{i<i} (1-p^{k-i})^n$
- Lemma

$$\sum_{k=1}^{k} np^{k-1} \prod_{i<1} (1-p^{k-i})^n \le \frac{1}{p} \sum_{k \in Z} np^k \exp\left(-np^k\right) = O\left(\frac{1}{p}\right) = O(N^{1/k})$$

#### Performance analysis (continued)



# Performance analysis (continued)

• Theorem distribution of number of mined blocks [explicit empty blocks]:  $E\left[u^{M_n}\right] = (1 + p^k (u - 1))^n - (1 - p^k)^n + \sum_{1 < k} ((1 + p^{k-1} (u - 1))^n - (1 - p^{k-1})^n)) \prod_{j < 1} (1 - p^{k-j})^n + u^n \prod_{j < k} (1 - p^{k-j})^n$ 

#### Performance analysis (end)

• Simulation of green mining



# Conclusion

- The Energy waste due to proof of work is not sustainable in cryptocurrencies in the near future.
- A reversed leader election can replace the burden of the PoW for mining difficulty
- Highly dynamic, work for any mining population up to N (arbitrary large)
- No need of parameter update

# Perspective

- How resilient is the scheme against attack
- Eg 51% attack.
  - block nursing vs PoW farming
  - Preliminary analysis indicates
    - to get  $\varepsilon$  advantage one should need  $2\varepsilon \log(1/p)$  more resources than the adversary