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UID:591@lincs.fr
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20201214T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20201214T180000
DTSTAMP:20201209T074913Z
URL:https://www.lincs.fr/events/thesis-defense-mechanisms-and-architecture
 s-to-encourage-the-massive-and-efficient-use-of-local-renewable-energy/
SUMMARY:Thesis defense "Mechanisms and architectures to encourage the
 massive and efficient use of local renewable energy"
DESCRIPTION:To meet carbon reduction goals in Europe but worldwide too\, a
 large number of renewable distributed energy resources (DER) still need to
 be deployed.\nAiming at mobilizing private capital\, several plans have
 been developed to put end-customers at the heart of the energy transition\,
 hoping to accelerate the adoption of green energy by increasing its
 attractiveness and profitability.\nSome of the proposed models include the
 creation of local energy markets where households can sell their energy to
 their neighbors at a higher price than what the government would be willing
 to pay (but lower than what other customers normally pay)\, shared
 investment models in which consumers own a carbon-free power plant such as
 a wind turbine or a solar farm and they obtain dividends from its
 production to collective auto-consumption models in which several families
 are ‘hidden’ behind the same smart meter\, allowing them to optimize
 their aggregated consumption profile and therefore maximizing the value of
 their DER.\n\nOne of the main objectives of the thesis is to understand
 these different incentives as they will play a crucial role in tackling
 climate change if correctly implemented. To do so\, we design a framework
 for ‘local energy trading’ that encompasses a large number of
 incentives.\nIn the context of local energy trading\, we study the
 interactions of prosumers (consumers with generation capabilities) located
 in the same Low Voltage network\, possibly behind the same feeder. These
 prosumers will still be connected to the main power grid and they will have
 the option\, as they do today\, to buy and sell to/from their utility
 company at a fixed price (a flat rate or a Time-of-Use\, for example). For
 these agents to fully benefit from the advantages of local energy trading\,
 we shall assume that they own appliances (such as batteries) that\, without
 changing their perceived energy demand\, can enable them to change their
 net energy demand as seen from outside their homes. Modeling prosumers as
 rational utility maximizers\, they will schedule their battery to decrease
 the cost associated with their net energy demand (as their perceived demand
 remains unchanged).\n\nIn the first part of the thesis\, we investigate
 competitive models in which prosumers sell their surplus to their neighbors
 via a local energy market. We analyze different strategies that players
 could use to participate in these markets and their impact on the normal
 operation of the power grid and the Distribution System Operator. In this
 regard\, it is shown that sequential markets can pose a problem to the
 system and a new market mechanism that exploits domain knowledge is
 proposed to increase the efficiency of the local trades.\n\nIn the second
 part of the thesis\, we delve into incentives that can be implemented
 through cooperation. In this regard\, we use cooperative game theory to
 model the shared investment into energy storage and photovoltaic panels
 (PV) by a group of prosumers. For the studied model we show that a stable
 solution (in the core of the game) exists in which all participants
 cooperate and we provide an efficient algorithm to find it. Furthermore\,
 we also show that cooperation is stable for participants that already own
 batteries and PVs but prefer to operate them in coordination to increase
 their value\, effectively implementing collective
 auto-consumption.\nFinally\, we demonstrate how to integrate both models:
 the shared investment and the cooperative control of existing resources
 into a single cooperative framework which also enjoys the existence of
 stable outcomes. For this later model\, we propose to decouple the return
 over investments (ROI) obtained between the ROI produced by the investment
 in hardware and the ROI obtained by cooperation itself. By doing so\, we
 can offer the former profit to external investors to raise the required
 capital (although nothing forbids the member of the coalition to
 contribute) and the latter to the actual consumers.\n\nHere's the streaming
 link to follow:
 https://telecom-paris.zoom.us/j/99499019699?pwd=anB2STVlWWZ2YnUzZ015bEh1dU5
 CUT09\n\n- ID de réunion : 994 9901 9699\n- Code secret : 371226
CATEGORIES:PhD Defense
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TZID:Europe/Paris
X-LIC-LOCATION:Europe/Paris
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DTSTART:20201025T020000
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:CET
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