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UID:742@lincs.fr
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20230111T113000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20230111T123000
DTSTAMP:20230124T132511Z
URL:https://www.lincs.fr/events/optimal-bounds-for-the-no-show-paradox-via
 -sat-solving/
SUMMARY:Optimal Bounds for the No-Show Paradox via SAT Solving
DESCRIPTION:The participation criterion is a social choice criterion that
 characterizes voting rules. A voting rule satisfies this criterion if\,
 considering a is the winner of the election\, the addition of a ballot
 where candidate a is preferred to candidate b should not make b win.\nWhen
 a voting rule fails the participation criterion\, the phenomenon is called
 the no-show paradox (Fishburn and Brams\, 1983). With this paradox comes
 several questions. One of them is to obtain a bound (on the number of
 candidates and/or voters) that characterizes the criterion's satisfaction
 for a given voting rule.\nIn this talk\, I will first present the
 participation criterion\, some voting rules that satisfy it and some that
 do not (Moulin\, 1987). Then\, I will focus an article of Brandt et al.
 (2017)\, which presents a way to obtain optimal bounds for the no-show
 paradox via SAT solving.\n\nReferences\nFelix Brandt\, Christian Geist\,
 and Dominik Peters. Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving.
 2017.\nPeter C. Fishburn and Steven J. Brams. Paradoxes of preferential
 voting. 1983.\nHervé Moulin. Condorcet’s principle implies the no show
 paradox. 1987.
CATEGORIES:Network Theory,Working Group,Youtube
LOCATION:Room 4A113\, 19 place Marguerite Perey\, Palaiseau\, France
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=19 place Marguerite Perey\,
 Palaiseau\, France;X-APPLE-RADIUS=100;X-TITLE=Room 4A113:geo:0,0
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TZID:Europe/Paris
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DTSTART:20221030T020000
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