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UID:557@lincs.fr
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20200916T140000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20200916T150000
DTSTAMP:20200925T133829Z
URL:https://www.lincs.fr/events/francois-baccelli-nash-equilibrium-structu
 re-of-a-class-of-spatial-competition-games/
SUMMARY:Seminar presentation "Nash equilibrium structure of a class of
 spatial competition games"
DESCRIPTION:We study an N-player game where a pure action of each player is
 to\nselect a non-negative function on a Polish space supporting a
 finite\ndiffuse measure\, subject to a finite constraint on the integral of
 the\nfunction. This function is used to define the intensity of a
 Poisson\npoint process on the Polish space. The processes are independent
 over\nthe players\, and the value to a player is the measure of the union
 of\nits open Voronoi cells in the superposition point process.
 Under\nrandomized strategies\, the process of points of a player is thus a
 Cox\nprocess\, and the nature of competition between the players is akin
 to\nthat in Hotelling competition games. We characterize when such a
 game\nadmits Nash equilibria and prove that when a Nash equilibrium
 exists\, it\nis unique and comprised of pure strategies that are
 proportional in the\nsame proportions as the total intensities. We give
 examples of such\ngames where Nash equilibria do not exist.\n\nThis is a
 joint work with Venkat Anantharam\, UC Berkeley\, EECS.
CATEGORIES:Seminars,Youtube
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TZID:Europe/Paris
X-LIC-LOCATION:Europe/Paris
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DTSTART:20200329T030000
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